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Introduction
Agent based Internet environments are an interesting alternative to existing ap-
proaches of building software systems. The enabling feature of agents is that they
allow software development based on the abstraction (a ‘metaphor’, see [70]) of ele-
ments of the real world. In other words, they allow building software systems, which
work as human societies, in which members share products and services, cooperate
or compete with each other. Organisational, behavioural and functional models etc
applied into the systems can be ‘imported’ from the real world1.
Other, most commonly cited encountered advantages of agents are [70]:
• Agents improve system deployment and facilitate system integration and coali-
tion formation.
• Agents allow a broad range of users to access a broad range of services offered
by various organisations (some of them may be even in competition with each
other).
Moreover agents present a number of technological advantages such as bandwidth
conservation, faster task completion, latency reduction, disconnected operation, load
balancing and dynamic deployment [46].
The growing interest in agent technologies in the European Union was expressed
through the foundation of the Coordination Action for Agent-Based Computing,
funded under the European Commission’s Sixth Framework Programme (FP6). The
action, called AgentLink III is run by the Information Society Technologies (IST)
programme. The long-term goal of AgentLink is to put Europe at the leading edge
of international competitiveness in this increasingly important area.
According to AgentLink ‘Roadmap for Agent Based Computing’ [70] agent-
based systems are perceived as ‘one of the most vibrant and important areas of
research and development to have emerged in information technology in recent
years, underpinning many aspects of broader information society technologies.’
However, with the emergence of the new paradigm, came also new challenges.
One of them is that agent environments, especially those which allow for mobility of
agents, are much more difficult to protect from intruders than conventional systems.
Agent environments still lack sufficient and effective solutions to assure their security
1Some case studies illustrating this software design and development approach are [6–9,74,75,
80, 108].
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[31,54,70]. The problem which till now has not been addressed sufficiently in agent-
based systems is privacy, and particularly the anonymity of agent users.
Anonymity plays a crucial role in many activities conducted in the Internet. For
example users may be reluctant to engage in web-browsing, message-sending and
file-sharing, unless they receive guarantees that their anonymity will be protected
to some reasonable degree [50]. Ceki Gu¨lcu¨ and Gene Tsudik [49] describe four
categories of internet applications where anonymity is required2: discussion of sen-
sitive and personal issues, information searches, freedom of speech in intolerant
environments and polling/surveying.
Although anonymity was studied extensively for traditional message-based com-
munication for which during the past twenty five years various techniques have been
proposed, for agent systems this problem has never been directly addressed. A pos-
sible reason for this could be that most techniques designed for traditional networks
are not directly applicable to MAS.
The research presented in this report aimed at filling this gap. As the first step
of the research an extensive study of agents and in particular of agent security was
performed. A summary of this study is presented in Chapter 1.
In the progress of this research, it was discovered that mobile agent systems,
though more difficult to protect in general, nevertheless have some characteristics
which may facilitate the protection of users’ privacy, and primarily that in MAS
each container could be set up as an anonymiser (a mix). Based on this observation
an untraceability protocol was proposed which has the advantage that it doesn’t
impose restrictions on agent’s autonomy. The protocol was implemented [63], its
performance [65] was evaluated and security studies [64,66] were performed. It was
also applied to an e-Health anonymous counselling scenario [62].
This report summarises results of studies aiming at the identification of threats
to privacy in agent-based systems and the methods of their protection.
2It is important to note that the authors don’t claim this set to be exhaustive.
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Chapter 1
Mobile Agent Systems
1.1 Brief Historical Outline
Agents integrate concepts from three research areas: Artificial Intelligence (AI),
Robotics, Distributed Computing.
In the fifties, in the relatively young fields of Robotics1, the use of computers
allowed researchers to build robots which behaved autonomously. Robots act on
behalf of people and aim to replace them in performing difficult tasks. Constructions
such as Shakey [84] were built. Shakey, developed in Stanford Research Institute’s
(SRI’s) pioneering Artificial Intelligence Center from 1966 to 1972, is called to be
the world’s first mobile robot able to reason about its surroundings [100].
In parallel, AI researched possibilities of conducting a natural language dialogue
with a machine. Significant developments in Natural Language Processing (NLP)
were made [14] between the sixties and the seventies. In 1966 Joseph Weizenbaum
presented Eliza [116], a program which could engage in a conversation with a user2.
Some people call this program a first software agent [30]. Another influential pro-
gram, Shrdlu (1968) [122], allowed a person to have a more ‘convincing’ (than with
Eliza) conversation with a simulated robot.
While Eliza just ‘pretended’ to be intelligent by using several language analysis
‘tricks’ [116], Shrdlu had more genuine understanding resulting from possessing a
knowledge base. Research on Knowledge Representation (KR) has been performed
since beginning of AI, and has laid down a basis for planning and reasoning. Many
KR methods were tried in the seventies and early eighties, such as heuristic question-
answering, neural networks, theorem proving, and expert systems, with varying suc-
cess [119].
In 1986 Marvin Minsky published ‘Society of Mind’ [77] which brought in the
notion of Multi-Agent Systems. His vision was that a complex system such as the
1The beginning of Robotics is dated at 1920, when Czechoslovakian writer Karel Cˇapek intro-
duced the word robot in the play ‘R.U.R. – Rossum’s Universal Robots’. The word comes from
the Czech robota, which means tedious labor [109].
2A Java applet faithfully recreating the original Eliza can be found at http://jerz.setonhill.
edu/if/canon/eliza.htm
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human mind should be understood as a collection of relatively simple agents, each of
which was a specialist in certain narrow domains. Through structures called K-lines,
agents would activate each other whenever their context became relevant [30].
Minsky’s concept was one of the first steps towards cooperation and interaction
of agents. These issues were studied scrupulously later and as a result, several agent
communication languages were defined in the nineties. The DARPA Knowledge
Sharing Initiative produced mechanisms for sharing knowledge, in particular KIF
(Knowledge Interchange Format [38]), KQML (Knowledge Query and Manipulation
Language [33]) and DAML [24] for modeling ontologies. These have provided the
first frameworks for interoperability of agents in heterogeneous environments [30].
Also other standardisation bodies such as W3C (World Wide Web Consortium) [112]
have developed specifications [113].
Also the nineties was the time were the Internet boom occurred. This boom
created a strong incentive for the development of intelligent agents. The Internet,
with its focus on interactive technologies – browsable web sites and email was
designed for human and not automated processing. There was a demand for such
automation so an automated counterpart to the interactive side of the Web was
needed.
In parallel to AI, Distributed Computing worked on new programming paradigms:
Code Distribution and Code Mobility. One of the first attempts to make code mobile
was made in the sixties with introduction of the Job Control Language (JCL) [16].
JCL enabled minicomputers to submit batch jobs to mainframes using a remote
entry system (RES). Another direct approach to code mobility is the rsh (remote
shell) command that wass introduced by 4.2BSD UNIX in 1984 [60]. However, the
real milestone was reached in the nineties with definition of scripting languages [120].
This opened up the way to implementations on a wider scale.
The most well-known script language was General Magic’s Telescript [118].
Telescript, a communications-oriented programming language, facilitated creating
network-independent intelligent agents and distributed applications. It is said that
Telescript aimed to do for cross-platform, network-independent messaging what
PostScript did for cross-platform, device-independent documents. It was with Tele-
script that the term mobile agent was used for the first time.
In the second half of the nineties mobile agents reached the peak of their popu-
larity. After the introduction of Telescript many mobile agent systems followed, most
implemented in Java, which already supported mobile code, and in other scripting
languages, such as Tcl/Tk or Python. Unfortunately, few systems actually deployed
them in an industrial setting. Eventually despite the fact that mobile agents raised
considerable interest in the research community (Agent Tcl [44], Tacoma [55], and
Mole [102], for example) and in industry (Aglets [59], Concordia [123], Jumping
Beans [1] etc), agents were not widely deployed. One of reasons for this situation
was security issues. It is extremely difficult to protect mobile code [31, 54]. This
problem is further described in Sections 1.3 and 1.4.
The nineties was the time when most of the previously described concepts con-
verged. This is apparent from the opening of standardisation processes3 Agent stan-
3Another manifestation was the unification of three major agent conferences into one. AA-
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dardisation has progressed simultaneously in three areas: Distributed Computing, AI
and as already mentioned in agent communication languages.
In Distributed Computing, the Object Management Group (OMG) [85] intro-
duced the first standard, called Mobile Agent Facility (MAF), in 1995. The standard
promoted interoperability among agent platforms and in 1988 was converted into
Mobile Agent System Interoperability Facility (MASIF) [86] under the influence of
a joint submission by IBM, General Magic, The Open Group and GMD FOKUS.
The MASIF standard (the latest version was published in 2000) focuses on agent
migration and omits any mention of agent communication.
The gap was filled by the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) [34],
which represents the AI community. FIPA was formed in 1996 to produce software
standards for heterogenous and interacting agents and agent-based systems. FIPA
have published specifications since 1997 and today there are twenty three standard
specifications describing different aspects of agent technology, for example, agent
communication, agent management, agent message transport, agent abstract archi-
tecture and agent applications. FIPA specifications focus on intelligent agent com-
munication via content languages, adopting the agent communication paradigm.
They adopt AI concepts related to knowledge representation, and interchange, aim-
ing at cooperative work of agents. Knowledge representation allows reasoning and
is a foundation for autonomy. FIPA 2000 specifications also discuss the aspect of
agent mobility.
Work on MASIF finished with the latest release in 2000 and was not continued.
On the other hand FIPA is still active and supports and promotes its standards
and agent technologies. This and other factors means that emerging agent systems
tend to comply to FIPA rather than to MASIF specifications. One such platform is
JADE [10, 106]. Nowadays JADE tends to be the most commonly used platform in
agent research (see [61]).
After the boom in agents, work on them is performed in a more regular manner.
1.2 Terminology
The fact that software agents were investigated via different research paths, implies
that the term software agents is defined in different ways. AI research emphasizes
intelligence, Distributed Computing research emphasises mobility, etc. The problem
escalated to such an extent that it was even reflected in literature (e.g. the famous
paper of Franklin and Graesser [36]). There were also attempts to define agents
using formal methods [69]. But even today there is no common definition.
Etymologically, the word ’agent’, originates from the Latin agere and was brought
to English in the 1471. Agere means to set in motion, drive, lead, conduct, act,
do [51] [73]. Thus, an agent is someone (something) who (which) acts. And software
agents are consequently – software entities able to act. Explaining the meaning of a
new word by recalling the etymology, has the advantage that it preserves consistency
with previous understanding of the word.
MAS (http://www.aamas-conference.org/) has become the most important (and the largest)
conference in the agent research world.
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Research communities use different adjectives such as autonomous, reactive,
social etc, in definitions of various kinds of agents, primarily software agents but
also intelligent agents or mobile agents and other. These adjectives describe key
properties of agents.
After reading these definitions, it comes out that the adjectives often repeat and
that their number is limited. This was noticed by Franklin and Graesser [36], and
Murch and Johnson [81] who proposed agent classification systems in which com-
binations of the adjectives describe different agent types. The set of the adjectives
is composed of the following4:
• Reactive (or sensing and acting) – responding in a timely fashion to changes
in the environment.
• Autonomous – able to exercise control over their own actions.
• Proactive (or goal-oriented or purposeful) – goal oriented and able to ac-
complish goals without prompting from a user, and reacting to changes in an
environment.
• Social (or socially able or communicative) – able to communicate both with
humans and other agents.
• Flexible – having no predetermined behavior (no scripted actions).
• Reasoning – able to reason about their actions.
• Adaptive (or learning) – changing behavior based on previous experience.
• Mobile – able to roam networks freely.
• Persistent – maintaining a process until the desired result has been achieved.
• Productive – capable of achieving desired results.
Franklin and Graesser [36] also add another property, the character, which indi-
cates the possession of a believable personality and emotional state.
The incoherence of agent definitions comes from the fact that separate research
and development groups took different subsets of this set of adjectives to describe
software agents. To avoid any misunderstandings, in this report the following con-
vention is used, that the properties are always stated explicitly, by adding proper
adjectives to the noun ‘agent’ (which consequently should be understood in its orig-
inal meaning based on its etymological root). Since the software context of agents
considered in this report is obvious the word software can be skipped, and from now
on, the phrases agent and software agent will be treated interchangeably.
Furthermore, this report is mostly focused on mobile autonomous agents. This
means software which can roam networks freely and make independent (unpre-
dictable) decisions about which agent platform to visit next. In this report, the
4The list is made by combining Franklin’s and Graesser’s [36], and Murch’s and Johnson’s [81]
classifications.
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terms: mobile autonomous agents, mobile agents and agents will be used inter-
changeably.
This was a semiformal approach to define and systematise agents. Its applica-
tion would allow researchers to more precisely demarcate the scope of their research
area. On the other hand it is worth to mention the common sense understanding of
the term ‘software agent’ – a software component, that is autonomous, proactive
and social [10]. This perception of agents is supported by FIPA, which despite the
fact that it does not directly define the notion of an agent, it gives a clear indica-
tion of the intended meaning, through specification of functionalities in an abstract
architecture. Specifications of the Agent Communication Language (ACL) and li-
brary of Communicative Acts address communication between agents (sociality). A
set of Interaction Protocols describes autonomous agent behaviours (proactiveness,
sociality and autonomy), and support for ontologies opens the way to autonomous
reasoning (autonomy) [34].
Generally an agent’s structure is described in terms of a state and a behaviour.
Formally, state is the set of properties (values, true propositions) that completely
describes the agent [88]. In practice, this refers to data (variables and static values)
describing the agent and the data held by the agent. Behaviour is a set of actions
performed in order to achieve a goal. It represents a task that an agent can carry
out [11].
To accomplish a goal, mobile agents roam from one network node (called a
container, see below) to another, starting from a base (a.k.a. (base station). The
sequence of containers to be passed is called a route. The agents’ goal can be
formulated through explicit indication of a node to be visited or in a more abstract
way, without indicating nodes. An example of a goal formulated in this way might
be: to provide information about the cheapest vendor of a certain product. In the
former case the node is called a destination.
An agent platform (AP) is an execution environment for software agents. It
supplies agents with various functionalities such as agent intercommunication, agent
autonomy, yellow pages, mobility etc.
Agent platforms are deployed horizontally over multiple hardware devices through
the containers. On each device at least one container may be set up. Each container
is an instance of a virtual machine and it forms a virtual agent network node. Con-
tainers make AP independent from underlying operating systems. Mobile agents are
able to migrate from one container to another. Consequently, when containers are
deployed on different devices, mobile agents can migrate between different devices.
The type of migration, when an agent travels to many containers and may
or may not return to its origin is called multi-hop migration. Each trip from one
container to another is called a hop. On the other hand there is one-hop migration
and a two-hop boomerang migration. A one-hop agent travels from its base to a
destination and then does not travel further. A two-hop boomerang agent travels
from its base to a destination and back again [89].
When agents can migrate only within one AP, they are said to have intra-
platform mobility. This is also sometimes called homogeneous migration since source
and destination have the same interfaces and provide the same environment for the
agents on both sides [25], in contrast to inter-platform or cross-platform mobility
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where agents are able to migrate across platforms. The latter, called also het-
erogenous migration, [25, 48] though targeted in standardisation processes, is not
supported in practice.
Agent platforms are implemented so that they allow either strong or weak mobil-
ity. In case of strong mobility both the code and the execution state of an agent are
transferred. Weak mobile agents lose their execution state during migration and thus
start their execution from the beginning after arriving at a new container [17, 37].
Agent platforms can be imagined as agent communities where agents are man-
aged and are given the means to interoperate (communicate and exchange services).
Many agent communities may coexist at the same time. Depending on the imple-
mentation of the platform, agents may be able to leave one community (platform)
and join another.
Finally it is important to mention the abstract agent platform which is provided
as a reference point by FIPA.
According to FIPA an agent platform must provide at least the following three
components [35] [87]:
• Agent Management System (AMS).
• Directory Facilitator (DF).
• Agent Communication Channel (ACC).
The AMS exerts supervisory control over access to and use of the agent platform. It
provides white-page and life-cycle services, maintaining a directory of agent identi-
fiers (AID) and agent states. Each agent must register with an AMS in order to get
a valid AID. The DF provides the default yellow page service for the platform. The
ACC is the software component controlling all the exchange of messages within the
platform, including messages to and from remote platforms [11].
In this report the MA-based communication, it means the network communi-
cation in which information is carried by mobile agents – active entities – moving
across network nodes, is often referred to traditional message-based communication
(or traditional communication or message-based communication) (for example, in
Chapter 2, when describing techniques for providing untraceability). For the latter,
the communication where messages – passive portions of data – are the carriers
of information is referred. In this broad understanding of the notion of message, a
network packet can be a message in particular.
Consequently MAS - Mobile Agent Systems are the systems with MA-based
communication, and traditional networks are the systems where traditional message-
based communication is performed.
1.3 MAS Overview: Benefits, Applications, Concerns
The agent technology offers a new paradigm of software development, in which
even more than in the object oriented approach, the development can be performed
through transferring concepts of the real world. The objects have been enriched
with an active behavioural part (the behaviours) and their communication skills
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were expanded. The behaviours show characteristics of intelligence: the agents infer
and make autonomous decisions, spontaneously take the initiative, cooperate and
interact with other agents, are goal oriented etc (see Section 1.2).
The agent technology offers a great aid in software design. Applications based
on agents can be developed and planned similarly to the initiatives based on people
and resources – system actors required to provide a new service are depicted, their
behaviours are described and after that the deployment is performed, just like a
new service is introduced in the real world. The service providers are moving to
various locations, the service and its description is announced and spread across
other agents. With common agent platform installed on all devices (which is the
direction the technology goes) there will be a society of agents performing in a way
similar to a society of human beings.
Additionally the technology offers advantages at technological level. They are
mostly related to the decentralisation of computing (which eliminates overloads
and single points of failure), uniformisation of communication (which among oth-
ers enables cooperation between different applications) or agent mobility. The last
characteristic is particularly welcomed in the applications were remote processing
is needed but at the same time maintaining continuous data transmission links is
hindered or uneconomical. An example of possible customer for such technology
is cellular telephony where connection is not always available (on the sea, in the
mountains, tunnels). Many robots designed for operation in areas of limited access
(zones of increased radioactivity at nuclear reactors for example) or for very distant
locations (including other planets, which are explored by unmanned space vehicles)
are in fact realisations of the concept of autonomous mobile agents.
Drawbacks are primarily related to immaturity of the technology. The solutions
are new and unknown, and without sufficiently long time of usage which would prove
their reliability. And actually many of them are instable, which discourages from
their use. Instead solutions based on older paradigms but tested and trustworthy
are preferred.
It is worth to note the invaluable source of information about agents applications
and other information about agents – the Internet portal of AgentLink III. AgentLink
III is the premier Coordination Action for Agent Based Computing, funded by the
European Commission’s 6th Framework Program. Launched on 1st January, 2004,
it provides support for the network of European researchers and developers with a
common interest in the agent technology through events aimed at industry outreach,
and standardisation issues, as well as providing support for academic events and
providing resources through the portal.
1.3.1 Benefits
The benefits of using the agent technology are as follows:
• Business benefits.
– Development of systems through metaphor of reality [68].
– Easier deployment [68].
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– Higher availability [31].
– Large-scale distributed or decentralized system integration with highly
adaptive and dynamic business logic [68].
– Flexibility and adaptability in business logic [68].
– Step-by-step system integration [68].
– Coalition formation [68].
• Technological benefits.
– Bandwidth conservation [46].
– Reduction of total completion time [46].
– Latencies reduction [46].
– Disconnected operation and mobile computing [46].
– Load balancing [46].
– Dynamic deployment [46].
– Improved querying of various information sources [21, 46].
Business Benefits
Development of Systems through Metaphor of Reality The agent technology
makes the next step, after the object oriented programming, towards the application
development based on mimicking structures, behaviours and processes existing in the
real world. Already in the object oriented approach the entities used in the system
could be modelled and described, yet their interactions and behaviours remained
artificial. In the real world stakeholders don’t communicate with each other through
mutual invocation of their methods.
In the agent paradigm instead, while all the advantages of the object approach
were kept – as inheritance, encapsulation, polymorphism etc – the dynamic, active
part is added. Agents show initiative, and they act spontaneously. They don’t in-
voke methods, but communicate. They don’t execute methods, but infer and make
autonomous decisions etc (see Section 1.2).
With such developed paradigm it becomes truly realistic to design application
on the basis of ‘transfer’ of solutions and concepts from the real world. If this is the
factory system to be built – the instrumentation and the operators are to be modeled
as agents and what should they do, what is their goal should be described [6]. If
this is about optimisation of logistics, the supplies, suppliers, and the goods are to
be represented as agents [75]. If people are the main participants of the system –
the human models should be applied, roles and behaviors assigned [74]. Then, after
the agents are deployed the system should evolve quite automatically – this is the
idea behind the mature agent technology [68].
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Easier Deployment In its target deployment the agent platform will be installed
on each computing device (PC, cellular phone, PDA etc). One of enablers of this
situation is the current development of agent applications – to deploy them users
must firstly set up the agent platform on their architectures. This way step by
step the platform spreads over the virtual world. With widely distributed agent
platforms, the deployment of each new agent application, requires nothing more than
the introduction of the new agents (or modification of old agents), which provide
functionalities of the application. The agents will disperse in the environment, inform
other agents about themselves, publish announcements in yellow pages services.
Almost exactly the same as it is performed in the real world.
Availability While on the one hand, companies and organisations can easily deploy
their systems, on the other users gain access to a great number of services offered
in a consistent and coherent form. Ideally there would be only one agent platform,
and the entire society of service providers (and customers) will be deployed on it.
Each person having an access to the virtual society (for example through having
installed the agent platform on their computer), has thereby the access to the
whole mass of services offered by various providers. All they need to do is to submit
their requirements to their agents, and in response the offers of many suppliers
will be returned. Additionally replication and mobility of agents allows the creation
of temporal copies able to accomplish their tasks locally at user devices. At the
same time the coherent structure of agent systems prevents from the proliferation
of different, often incompatible systems providing particular services from different
organisations, where a user must comply with a new protocol each time they want
to implement a new service.
Large-Scale Distributed or Decentralized System Integration with Highly
Adaptive and Dynamic Business Logic Existing solutions are generally cen-
tralised, pulling everything onto one platform, which leads to overloads, delays
related to them, up to denials of service. So to avoid these all negative effects,
limitations on complexity and flexibility of the solutions are imposed. Centralised
structures can also easily become targets of attacks or establish single points of
failure.
A decentralised agent approach divides and conquers complexity by pushing
a large part of the business logic out onto source systems so that much of the
processing can be done on each of them. This distributes workload and increases
robustness because the local processing can be performed independently of other
systems, resulting in fewer and more relevant interactions with these systems, at a
higher level of abstraction [68].
Exemplar benefits resulting from the decentralised computing can be found in
the agent based crisis management [74, 107]. The traditional way of performing
crisis management is through establishing a central crisis management centre. Such
a centre however forms a single point of failure, and causes that all areas not
communicated with it are left on their own.
The agent technology enabled organising ad-hoc structures in which agents
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communicate with each other and exchange information about the environment in
order to achieve the most faithful picture of the critical situation at the local area.
For example agents representing individuals having medical skills inform about their
presence, and so the people requiring medical attendance do. Then the matching
agents assign the former to the latter, taking into consideration the geographical
proximity, the seriousness of the injuries and the skills of the physicians etc. With
such local ad-hoc structures, crisis management and decision making could be flex-
ibly (and when necessary) shifted to the local areas in case the communication with
the global centre was lost or the centre turned inoperative (for example because of
terroristic attack).
Flexibility and Adaptability in Business Logic As easy is to deploy agents,
that easy is to update the software based on them. It can be performed at system
runtime without any interruption in the provision of services, through transition
periods during which old and new agents temporarily coexist, and successive step-
by-step removals, when the old agents are withdrawn, as they are getting free of their
duties. This way of application updating proves a level of dynamism and flexibility
that goes far beyond current release policies. Agent communication and behaviour
capabilities complete the picture, being very well suited to high-level service-based
interactions, the decentralised implementation of business logic, and for adapting
and handling change in their environment.
Step-by-Step System Integration The highly component-based structure of
agent systems fits integrating approaches of system development. Systems are de-
veloped step by step and each step results in added value for the business. For
instance in the first stage of development the agent application may be addressed
to smaller group of customers and may offer limited functionality. If the application
is accepted by the customers, it can be easily made available to a wider public,
thanks to the facilitated application deployment. Also the functionality of the appli-
cation can be fluently extended, through dynamic updating or introduction of new
agents. This mode of integration is particularly beneficial in the current economic
climate, in which many companies have seen mega-projects fail [68].
Coalition Formation One of the intensively developed agent features is posses-
sion of social skills, related to inter-agent communication, negotiation, service ex-
change etc. These social skills enable agents to cooperate, to form coalitions and
consequently to create aggregate entities capable of offering new, different or better
services than might otherwise be available. It is similar to making possible cooper-
ation of computer systems which previously operated in isolation – the benefits are
numerous: faster service delivery (an overloaded service provider can ask for support
their cooperating partners), more complex and comprehensive services (if additional
services are required to fulfill a user demand, which are not provided by an appli-
cation, the application can delegate this part of task to another application) more
detailed and more appropriate information (agents cooperate in order to obtain the
information of high quality) etc.
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Technological Benefits
Bandwidth Conservation Conventional client-server systems are based on ex-
changing messages between client and server. When more interactions with servers
are necessary to accomplish a client task, then the communication takes a significant
part of the task and consumes a large amount of network bandwidth. The mobile
agents technology saves the bandwidth by sending agent to the server and enabling
the intermediate interactions to be performed locally. This was illustrated by the ex-
periments conducted by D’Agents Research Team from Dartmouth’s Thayer School
of Engineering [46].
Reduction of Total Completion Time Since the agent technology significantly
reduces the number of intermediate interactions through the network, it also speeds
up the applications. At the same time, the agents complete the tasks faster only
if the interactions involve enough operations for the transmission time-savings to
make up for the migration overhead. The experiments of D’Agent Team [46] showed
that agent performance relative to Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) improves with
decreasing speed of network, but in relatively fast networks agents perform worse
than the corresponding client-server solution works.
Latencies Reduction The substitution of remote processing with local processing
caused by moving the computing unit from remote location to the local one ob-
viously eliminates all delays related to communication. Additionally, mobile agents
can dynamically choose the container on which to perform their task, to optimally
minimise latencies. For example sometimes it may be sensible for an agent to mi-
grate to a distant location (so its operation will require additional communication
with original container) of higher computational power (so the received computa-
tion speedup will compensate the time spent on communication). The Sumatra chat
server, written as a mobile Java agent, minimized the maximum latency two to four
times comparing to the fixed-location server and its clients [46].
Disconnected Operation and Mobile Computing Traditional client-server net-
work applications require a continuous (i.e. if connection is lost, the execution is
interrupted and it must be restarted after the connection is reestablished) or in
optimistic version – semi continuous (the execution is suspended when the compo-
nents are disconnected, and continued from the last executed command after the
connection is reestablished) connection between the client and server. For example
in traditional systems when the connection gets broken during processing of a query,
the user client must repeat the query when the connection is established again. This
makes the client-server model harder to adapt to mobile computing since mobile
computers often disconnect from the network, and when they reconnect, they often
find themselves with a different network connection in terms of bandwidth, latency
or reliability. A mobile agent, on the other hand, has the ability to operate discon-
nected from the client machine. It moves to a server or proxy machine and conducts
its task independently to the status of connection. The connection is necessary only
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for sending back the results. Moreover, agent based applications can easily adapt
to network links of different bandwidths and latencies [46].
Load Balancing Load-balancing problems arise in a distributed computing system
when there is an unequal work allocation at the different processing elements in the
system. Three features of mobile agents support dynamic work allocation: agents can
move from one platform to another, they can move across heterogeneous platforms,
and they carry all application-specific code with them, rather than requiring pre-
installation of that code on the destination machine. Most existing load-balancing
systems are not as flexible as mobile agents, since they lack one of the three key
features. For these reasons, load balancing is a significant growth area for the mobile-
agent technology [46].
Improved Querying of Various Information Sources The typical Internet usage
schema, which is usually related to information searching (e.g. searching for the
most attractive price offer for a product or a service, such as the cheapest flight)
relies on connecting to the website of one product/service provider, analysing and
memorising (notes) the offer, and going to the next provider. Users usually perform
a couple of such interactions (making a compromise between the time consumption
of the task and the expected profit), to finally analyse (compare) the obtained
results. Agents can improve this situation because these all described tasks can be
delegated to them [21]. With agents it is sufficient that users describe their search
criteria and launche the agent (see also Section 1.3.2). While the agent performs
its task, users can spend their time on other activities, because no additional user-
system interactions are required. Usually though there is no time to spend, because
the agent (thanks to proliferation, cooperation, effective computing) finishes the
task quickly.
Dynamic Deployment As with load balancing, mobile agents support the most
general form of dynamic deployment, where an application can distribute its com-
ponents dynamically to arbitrary network sites and those components can move
at will from one site to another as conditions change. In fact, although the true
strength of mobile agents is their combination of individual strengths, it can be
argued that flexible dynamic deployment is what makes mobile agents such an ef-
fective choice for distributed applications. This is the dynamic deployment which
allows mobile agents to conserve bandwidth, reduce latencies and completion times,
handle disconnected operation, and balance load [46].
1.3.2 Applications
Four broad categories of applications are particularly suitable for agents:
• Assistant agents, such as agents engaged in gathering information (informa-
tion agents) or executing transactions on behalf of their human principals on
the Internet.
1.3. MAS OVERVIEW: BENEFITS, APPLICATIONS, CONCERNS 21
• Multi-agent distributed decision-making systems, where the agents participat-
ing in the system must together make some joint decisions [68].
• Multi-agent simulation systems, where the multi-agent system is used as a
model to simulate some real-world domain.
• Multi-agent based integration.
Assistant Agents
Assistant agents per definition aim at assisting users and performing tasks for them.
Assistant agents can moreover represent users and perform tasks on behalf of users.
The most often implemented function realised by assistant agents is informa-
tion searching. The user defines their criteria and launches the agent which will
autonomously crawl through the Internet resources. This searching is supported by
knowledge representations (e.g. ontologies), inferring (for example an agent search-
ing for a price offer may autonomously decide to look for offers presented in different
currencies, after it infers the relationship between the prices), and communication
and social skills (the agent may delegate the searching task (or its part) to other
agents).
Another very popular (or even more popular) ‘incarnation’ of assistant agents are
shopping agents (a.k.a. personal shoppers, shopping robots, comparison shopping
services, or shop bots). Despite the fact that the Internet has made ‘effective’
(leading to the lowest price) shopping much easier for consumers (since moving
from one online shop to another is just a matter of a few mouse clicks, comparing
to time consuming physical moving or phone conversations), it still can be time-
consuming, as users have to know the Web address of each online shop, and spend
time searching for products in the site. Thus the idea of shopping agents to which all
these tasks can be delegated. Currently numerous comparison shopping agents exist
over the Web, which not only autonomously crawl the Web for the best offers, but
also help users in specifying their preferences. They also guide them about choosing
products if the users have only a general idea of what they want to buy [27].
Multi-Agent Decision-Making Systems
Applying agents to building decision systems became popular for two reasons: firstly
because the agent approach is very suitable for making simulations (see Chapter
1.3.2), based on which, the decisions about the original processes and behaviours
can be made. Secondly, because the highly componential structure of agent systems
facilitates modelling of problem situations, which is especially true in case of the
situations in which many influential factors exist.
The DaimlerChrysler’s research team in Berlin has implemented a materials flow
control system at one of the company’s factories, entirely based on autonomous
intelligent software agents. The system is used in the live production of cylinder
heads from blocks of raw metal. Each metal block has to go through many processes
with different machine tools to get shaped according to high specification. There is
considerable flexibility in the choice of routes through the production line and the
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order in which jobs are done [90]. Thus the aim of the agent system is to make
optimal the choice of routes, and to most effectively schedule the jobs.
The decentralised approach obtained with the agent technology, the decompo-
sition of the problem into autonomous units represented by goal-oriented agents,
able to communicate and negotiate with each other resulted in high flexibility of the
system, which in contrary to traditional approaches based on central control, can
respond very quickly to sudden changes in the environment (related for example
to machine disruption) [90]. With this dynamic agent coordination production of
cylinder heads at DaimlerChrysler achieved savings of 10% [68].
Another example comes from the area of telecommunications and is related to
the management of mobile telecommunications networks. Mobile networks typically
have several types of network components: base stations, base-station controllers,
mobile switching centres, etc [68], for which the most appropriate locations must
be selected to obtain the most efficient work of the network. The problem lies in the
fact that the ‘appropriateness’ of the locations is strongly dependant on the pattern
of network traffic, which changes dynamically and very often – by time of day or
by day of the week. Thus the optimal system would be the one which is able to
dynamically reconfigure itself and to move its components according to the changes
in the network traffic. With agents it has become possible to build such a system.
Although moving network components is not usually feasible, the functionality of
the components (encapsulated in agent) can be moved [68].
Other examples include decision making during a crisis situation [74], optimisa-
tion of a corrugated-box manufacturing plant [6], or scheduling of cargo fleets [75].
Multi-Agent Simulation
Agents especially fit simulation of systems and processes in which multiple inter-
acting entities participate. One example is agent based battlefield simulation [7]. In
this simulation agents represent soldiers, military outfit and outward features, and
agents are grouped in teams with associated team roles (e.g. commander, observer,
etc.) [7]. Another example is simulation of manufacturing process, where agents are
used to model the factory instrumentation and its operators [6].
Another example is the RoboCupRescue – Simulation League [107] – an inter-
national testbed for the simulation of software agents and robots performing Urban
Search And Rescue (USAR) missions. The main purpose of the RoboCupRescue
Simulation Project is to provide emergency decision support through the integra-
tion of disaster information, prediction, planning, and human interface. A generic
urban disaster simulation environment is constructed on network computers. Het-
erogeneous intelligent agents such as fire fighters, commanders, victims, volunteers,
etc conduct search and rescue activities in this virtual disaster world. Real-world
interfaces such as helicopter image synchronizes the virtuality and the reality by
sensing data. Mission-critical human interfaces (for instance based on PDA) sup-
port disaster managers, disaster relief brigades, residents and volunteers to decide
their action to minimize the disaster damage.
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Agent Based System Integration
The agent technology facilitates the integration of heterogeneous systems. One
scenario of such integration is to define interface agents which are able to interact
with integrated systems. The interface agents must be able to transfer (forward)
the data and the services originated in the systems, connecting them with the agent
environment, where the data and the services will be further processed by other
agents supported with the mechanisms for agent communication and interaction.
For instance such integration solutions are offered by Global IDs Inc. [39], whose
data integration products are capable of simultaneously monitoring many hundreds
of enterprise systems for relevant changes in data or metadata, by deploying mobile
agents onto those systems [40]. The agents monitor local databases or applications,
keep track of changes, can pre-process data and only forward relevant events or
structured derived data to centralized collectors – in real time if required. The mo-
bility of the agents allows highly customized functionality, which can be dynamically
updated. Thus, the business user can change the business rules that are being exe-
cuted at any point in time, while only relevant drivers and adapters are transferred
to a source system. Agents can asses the impact of changes in the business rules
and handle that impact throughout the integration process [68].
Application Domains
According to [68] the application domains where agent technologies will play a
crucial role include:
• Ambient Intelligence – with agents enabling the seamless delivery of ubiqui-
tous computing, continuous communications and intelligent user interfaces to
consumer and industrial devices.
• Grid Computing, where multi-agent system approaches will enable efficient
use of the resources of high-performance computing infrastructure in science,
engineering, medical and commercial applications.
• Electronic Business, where agent-based approaches are already supporting
the automation and semi-automation of information gathering activities and
purchase transactions over the Internet.
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology, where intelligent agents may sup-
port the coherent exploitation of the data revolution occurring in biology, and
others including monitoring and control, resource management, and space,
military and manufacturing applications, for example.
Ambient Intelligence The Ambient Intelligence vision [53] of people being sur-
rounded by intelligent interfaces which form the environment capable to seamlessly
and unobtrusively recognise and respond to the presence and to the needs of peo-
ple, in fact describes an environment of numerous embedded and mobile devices
working and interacting to support user-centred goals and activities. Realisation of
such environment requires a componential approach, with components being able to
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interact with each other while being widely distributed. This plus the required char-
acteristics of intelligence, autonomy, often mobility etc make the agent technology
practically dedicated for implementation of this environment [68].
Grid Computing Grid Computing is a form of distributed computing that involves
coordinating and sharing computing, application, data, storage, or network resources
across dynamic and geographically dispersed organizations [47]. Grid applications, in
which typically many services are involved, spread over a geographically distributed
environment, which new services join and existing ones leave, thus very strongly sug-
gest the use of agent-based computing. In this view, agents act on behalf of service
owners, managing access to services, and ensuring that contracts are fulfilled. They
also act on behalf of service consumers, locating services, agreeing contracts, and
receiving and presenting results. Just as in the Ambient Intelligence vision, agents
will be required to engage in interactions, to negotiate, and to make pro-active run-
time decisions while responding to changing circumstances. In particular, agents will
need to collaborate and to form coalitions of agents with different capabilities in
support of new virtual organisations [68].
Biological Sciences One of the applications of agent systems in the Biological
Sciences is simulation modeling of biological systems. Another area of application
in biology is in Bioinformatics. With the arising magnitude of biological informa-
tion, there is a great need for automated information-gathering and information-
inference tools. Information-gathering agents may provide assistance to human re-
searchers in finding appropriate research literature or in conducting automated or
semi-automated testing of data. In addition, data mining agents may present hu-
man researchers with a set of potential hypotheses that can be induced from the
data sources. In particular, the kinds of resources available in the bioinformatics
domain, with numerous databases and analysis tools independently administered in
geographically distinct locations, lend themselves almost ideally to adoption of a
multi-agent approach [68].
Electronic Business To date agents have been used in the first stages of eCom-
merce, product and merchant discovery and brokering. The next step will involve
moving into real trading – negotiating deals and making purchases. According to [68]
in the very near future a boom in agent-mediated auctions is expected. The auc-
tion is a long-established and well-understood trading mechanism, and the available
agent technology can support such agent mediated auction houses. It is anticipated
that electronic commerce will dramatically change the supply chain since consumer
will be able to contact directly the producer and avoid resellers. In the short term,
travel agencies and retailing will be the primary business-to-consumer application
domains using agent technology in eCommerce. On the other hand, it can be fore-
seen that agent technology in this market will enable small and medium enterprises
to collaborate and form coalitions in much more flexible ways, almost regardless of
geographic location [68].
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1.3.3 Concerns
New Security Threats
The security of the currently predominating static distributed systems have been
studied extensively and resulted in the design and implementation of numerous
countermeasures. The mobile agent technology introduces significantly new threats
[31] which relate to agents’ mobility. Although these threats are the concern of
various scientific groups and a number of solutions has been proposed, there are
still problems not completely resolved. The most important difficulty is the agent
exposure to the visited host. When an agent migrates to a remote host it is fully
dependent on the good intentions of the host owners. If the host was maliciously
altered, it is hard, if not impossible, [31] to recognize it.
The agent technology researchers agreed that resolving the security issues and
developing a collection of security mechanisms to counter the associated risks, would
allow users to freely develop useful and innovative solutions to existing problems and
find a wide array of application areas that would benefit from this technology [54].
The issues of MAS security are further described in Section 1.4.
Lack of Mature Software Development Methodologies
The lack of mature software development methodologies for agent-based systems
is another of the most fundamental obstacles to the take-up of agent technology.
Basic principles of software and knowledge engineering need to be applied to the
development and deployment of multi-agent systems and they also need to be
augmented to suit the differing demands of this new paradigm [68]. The other
question is related to agents creation frameworks. Currently the frameworks are fit
for experienced system developers. To allow widespread popularity of agents, the
agents construction environments for novice users should be introduced [76].
Small Number of Mature, Development-Oriented Platforms
Although there are several relatively mature, development-oriented platforms (with
fewer agent-specific capabilities) and some richer, more research-oriented agent plat-
forms, most platforms are still too immature for operational environments [68]. A
larger number of mature platforms might enable a competition between the plat-
forms providers and finally result in the improvement of their quality.
Lack of Awareness of the Potential Applications of Agent Systems
Agent technology is a relatively recent technology and there is a lack of awareness
of the potential applications of agent systems [68]. This prevents system devel-
opers from applying the agent technology to their solutions, since the developers
are unaware of the features of the technology and the paths of the development.
AgentLink [2] propose a number of steps to be taken to facilitate greater awareness.
These steps mainly rely on developing various case studies [68].
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Cost of System Development and Implementation Due to Recentness of the
Technology
Another concern is the cost of system development and implementation, both in
direct financial terms and in terms of required skills and timescales. High deployment
costs are a feature of any new technology. As agent design tools and standard
methodologies are developed, and as development teams gain greater experience,
these costs should fall [68].
Worse Performance in Particular Solutions
A mobile agent will not always perform better than a client-server solution. If the
agent code is larger than the total intermediate data, the mobile agent must perform
worse, since it will transfer more bytes across the network than the client-server
solution. Similarly, if the network is fast enough, the agent might do worse even if the
code is smaller, since mobile agents are typically written in an interpreted language
for portability and security reasons. With a fast and reliable network, interpreting
the agent on the server might be slower than transmitting the intermediate data to
the client. As network speed and reliability drops, however, or data sizes increase,
the situation changes considerably [45].
1.4 MAS Protection
The problem of the protection of agent systems involves the two questions:
• The issue of the protection of the agent platform from malicious agents.
• The issue of the protection of agents from malicious platforms.
Protection of agent platforms is relevant to the general problem of protection of
execution environments from untrusted code, which has been investigated for many
years and resulted in proposal of many efficient solutions. One of the recent instances
(before agents) of the problem is related to client-server applications, where part of
the code is executed at the client machine (e.g. aplets or AcitveX controls).
The techniques aiming at protecting agent platforms are based on the four main
concepts:
• Detection of the maliciousness of the code prior to its execution (antivirus
software works in this manner).
• Separation of the executed code in the execution environment from other
processes and thorough control of its access to the system resources.
• Providing guaranties of safety of untrusted code (to make it trusted).
• Assuring safe execution of an untrusted code.
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For detection of maliciousness of the code prior to its execution, apart from
the basic technique massively used in antivirus systems, namely detecting through
code signatures of malicious software, a method dedicated particularly to agents
was proposed, called Path Histories [20, 89]. The method relies on agents securely
creating lists of all the hosts they interacted with, so a new container can determine
whether to execute the agent or not. Another method specific to agents is State
Appraisal Functions [31]. The state appraisal functions aim at allowing an agent
container to asses the level of alteration of the agent’s state which occurred during
the agent’s migration. Based on the assessment the container can decide what
privileges to grant an agent.
Software Based Fault Isolation [54] belongs to the second group of techniques
(based on code separation). In this method, each untrusted code is stored into
a distinct virtual address space called a fault domain. Then it is assured that all
memory calls are performed only within the domain. This technique, known as
sandboxing gained high popularity and is used, for example, in Java applications.
Another approach based on code separation allow memory calls out of the address
space dedicated for the untrusted code but these calls are controlled by reference
monitors [54].
The basic method for providing guarantees of safety of untrusted code is through
signing the code [54]. Another approach relies on providing a formal proof of safety
of agent code [83].
An example of assuring safe execution of an untrusted code is Safe Code In-
terpretation [54]. In this method agents are run in interpreted environments and
they can only run commands of the interpreter. Then the interpreters can either
detect harmful commands and disallow their execution, or assure correct execution
of commands [54].
Most of the described methods proved to be sufficient and it wouldn’t be an
exaggeration to say that the protection of agent platforms reached an acceptable
level. On the contrary, the problem of agents’ protection from malicious platforms
establishes a serious challenge for researchers. This is related to the fact, that exe-
cution environments, namely agent containers on which agents are run, are out of
the control of the agents and their owners.
Thus, in practice most methods focus on detection of malicious alterations,
rather than on their prevention. Mostly it is done through the application of data
integrity checking mechanisms, such as message digests or message authentication
codes, to agents. If the agent code was maliciously altered, this alteration is detected
at one of the next visited trustworthy containers after the harmful one. Then all
results produced by the agent during its migration can be discarded or a subset of
them. This group of methods include:
• Simple MAC based PRAC [125].
• Hash Chains [56].
• Chained MAC [56].
• Digital signatures [125].
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• Chained digital signatures [56].
• Partial Result Authentication Codes (PRAC) [125].
• PRAC with one way functions [125].
• Verifiable PRACs [125].
• Multiple-hops Protocol [22].
• Execution Tracing [111].
In the progress of the research on agent systems some methods aiming at secure
agent computation were proposed:
1. Multi-agent cryptographic protocol of Tate and Xu [105] is based on threshold
cryptography and oblivious transfer. The computation security is achieved
through involvement of multiple agents into computation of secure function.
2. A similar involvement of multiple entities into computation of one function
takes place in fault-tolerant approaches such as Server Replication [78] and
Agent Replication [125]. In the methods computing entities (servers and
agents respectively) are replicated to simultaneously calculate the result of
the function, which is later selected through voting [125].
3. Environmental Key Generation [97] is a scheme for allowing an agent to take
a predefined action when some environmental condition is true. When the
agent encounters an environmental condition, such as a particular string in
search, a key is generated, which allows executing some agent’s code. The
environmental condition is hidden through either a one-way hash or public
key encryption of the environmental trigger. The technique ensures that a
platform or an observer of the agent cannot uncover the triggering message
or response action by directly reading the agent’s code.
4. Hohl [52] describes a technique called Time Limited Blackboxes. Standard
non time limited blackboxes are implemented through scrambling the code
of agents, so the code, though performing the same work as the original,
is difficult to understand for external observers. Because there is no known
algorithm for providing Blackbox protection, the time limited variant was
introduced which allows achieving the blackbox security through changes of
agent structure.
5. Sander and Tschudin proposed use of encrypted functions [98]. The user en-
crypts a function s, which is then executed by the host, without the host
having access to s. Because Sander’s and Tschudin’s Undetachable Signa-
tures [98] were not proven to be safe, Kotzanikolaou (et al) extended the
research and introduced an undetachable signature scheme, based on expo-
nential computing with encrypted functions [58] which filled the gap.
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6. A provably secure protection is provided through introducing independent
third party, such as a Secure Computation Service of Algesheimer (et al) [3]
but this approach is in opposition to the whole idea of agent paradigm, where
one of the key objectives is that computations were performed by agents locally
at the containers where the agents arrived to. The Algesheimer’s approach
instead mixes the agent paradigm with the client-server paradigm.
Unfortunately the above methods are:
• either too theoretical (4),
• or too resource consuming and computationally costly (1, 2),
• or their security was not proven (5),
• or they address very narrow problems (5),
• or they impose too high restrictions on agents execution (6).
Thus the methods show rather limited applicability.
As a matter of fact, it is very difficult to propose a practical approach for assuring
safe execution of agents on remote containers unless safety of the containers was
guaranteed. Providing such a guarantee is extremely difficult (it can, for example,
require application of beyond-the-software measures such as physical separation of
computers, which hinders use of the computers [125]). However certain hopes are
raised with relation to the concept of security enforced with trusted hardware [121].
Examples of hardware-supported security methods include:
• Trusted Computing Modules [110].
• Tamper-Proof Environments (TPE) [121].
• Secure coprocessors and trusted environments [124, 125].
In the domain of mobile agents security, it is believed that without the hardware
support it would be impossible to protect the proper execution of mobile agents
[20, 111, 121, 126]. The opinion of Chess (et al) from IBM T. J. Watson Research
Center manifested in [20] that:
‘It is impossible to prevent agent tampering unless trusted (and tamper-
resistant) hardware is available in AMPs5. Without such hardware, a
malicious AMP can always modify/manipulate the agent.’
was agreed by most of agent security researchers.
Finally it must be noted that in the research on agents security, insufficient
attention has been paid to the issues of privacy in MAS, including anonymity of
agent users and untraceability of agents.
An interested reader may refer to [15, 54, 125] for alternative overviews of pro-
tection methods for MAS.
5AMP – Agent Meeting Point – in Chess’ (et al) nomenclature it denotes agent execution
environment (such as container).
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1.5 Chapter Summary
The chapter aimed at introducing the area of software agents. It started with a
description of the history of software agents, where it was depicted that the de-
velopment of agents was performed in three different research areas, thus some
concepts (for example the concept of agent itself) may have different meaning de-
pending on the area from which they originated. Then the concepts were introduced.
Section 1.3 gave an overview of agents domain and showed that agent based Inter-
net environments are an interesting alternative to the existing approaches of building
software systems and expose many enabling features. However, protection of their
security forms a great challenge, mainly because the agents are fully dependant on
agent platforms. Finally the issues of agents security together with already proposed
countermeasures were recalled in Section 1.4.
Chapter 2
Untraceability
2.1 Untraceability Introduction
Anonymity plays a crucial role in many activities conducted in the Internet. For
example users may be reluctant to engage in web-browsing, message-sending and
file-sharing, unless they receive guarantees that their anonymity will be protected
to some reasonable degree [50]. Ceki Gu¨lcu¨ and Gene Tsudik [49] describe four
categories of internet applications where anonymity is required1: discussion of sen-
sitive and personal issues, information searches, freedom of speech in intolerant
environments and polling/surveying.
There are two ways to disclose identity of a mobile agent’s owner by attacking
an agent: through reading the agent’s data or through traffic analysis (TA). If the
agent’s data are obscured (for example through encryption) then an attacker can
still learn about the agent’s origins through reading the agent address data (its base
address, the destination address) which must be explicit (since the agent uses them
for its operation) or by performing traffic analysis – for instance following the agent,
observing its migration paths.
The aim of untraceability protocols is to hide address data. They may also,
to a certain level, prevent from TA, but it is out of their power to achieve this
goal completely. This is because there are various, and mostly potent TA attacks
which can be executed to this aim. These attacks require more systemic defensive
solutions.
2.2 Untraceability Definitions
Anonymity is the property of users enabling them to use resources or services (the
items of interest) without disclosing their identity [82].
An attacker who observes an agent in order to disclose the identity of the agent’s
owner can use two methods (see Figure 2.1):
1It is important to note that the authors don’t claim this set to be exhaustive.
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• Reading the agent’s data.
• Traffic analysis (TA).
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Figure 2.1: Attacks against anonymity of mobile agents.
In regard to agent’s data, the data of the agent (describing the agent) and the
data held by agent, should be distinguished, because they differ significantly from
the point of view of their protection.
The data of the agent are: the agent’s execution code, the agent’s state, and
operational data. Operational data are the data required for basic performance of
mobile agent and they are at the agent’s full disposition through its whole (or the
major part of) lifecycle. An example of such data is the address of the base station
needed by the agent for its return. Since the operational data must be of high
availability for the agent, they are practically continuously exposed: they can not be
protected using any direct encryption schema.
The data held by an agent are the data necessary to realise its concrete tasks.
These data have to be accessible at the agent’s destination. If the agent carries
data which identify the agent’s owner (e.g. the unique identifier of the owner or its
indicative description), the owner’s identity can be easily disclosed. To obscure the
data of this type it is sufficient to encrypt them with the destination’s public key.
The data targets of an attacker aiming at anonymity of the agent’s owner
(anonymity attacker) are the address data, and the data held by the agent.
It is assumed that all agents are based on the same code and that they can be
represented by the same state machine. In other words, neither the code nor the
state are characteristic for a particular agent. If this assumption is not satisfied,
it opens a way to traffic analysis attacks based on agent distinguishing features,
which are described in Chapter 2.3. Traffic analysis (TA), is a process of intercept-
ing and examining agents in order to deduce information from their patterns of
communication (see Chapter 2.3 for more details).
Reading the agent’s address data or performing TA are the activities of tracing
the agent. They may lead an attacker to infer the identity of the agent’s owner, the
agent’s destination or both. Using the anonymity terminology dedicated for message
based communication [91] they aim at violating subsequently: sender anonymity,
receiver anonymity and relationship anonymity (also unlinkability)2.
The state of agent’s protection against tracing is called untraceability [91].
2Sender anonymity assures that it is not possible to identify the sender of a message. Receiver
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Figure 2.2: Internal (a) and external (b) adversaries.
2.3 Traffic Analysis
The term traffic analysis (TA) comes from military intelligence, and it describes a
process of intercepting and examining messages in order to deduce information from
their patterns of communication. The first significant uses of TA date the Word War
I. With the advent of Internet TA was soon applied to Information Technology (IT).
In IT, TA is defined as the analysis of network traffic flow for the purpose of
deducing information that is useful to an adversary. Examples of such information are
frequency of transmission, the identities of the conversing parties, sizes of packets,
flow identifiers used, etc [5,32,99]. Another definition is brought in by Chaum, who
describes the traffic analysis problem as the problem of keeping confidential who
converses with whom, and when they converse [18].
Traffic Analysis has been already studied for over twenty years and various TA
attacks were recognised and described. Of the prominent studies (e.g. [23, 26, 41,
49, 57, 71, 93, 95]), Raymond’s appears to be the most comprehensive (it actually
summarises all the others).
In this work the known attacks were referred to MAS. The description of the
attacks on the ground of message based communication are discussed in the already
mentioned works [26, 41, 57, 71, 93, 95]).
It must be underlined that TA concentrates on patterns of communication,
obtaining direct data indicating the base and/or destination is out of scope of TA
and as it was stated in the previous section (Section 2.2), it belongs to attacks
based on reading agent data.
2.3.1 Adversaries
The following types of attackers are considered:
Internal / external – The internal adversary is the adversary who succeeded in
compromising a container, and is able to observe agents within it (passive
anonymity means that the intended recipient cannot be inferred from the message. Relationship
anonymity means that it is untraceable who communicates with whom [91].
34 CHAPTER 2. UNTRACEABILITY
– see below) or even may obtain control over the container (active – see
below). The external adversary is the one who aims at particular container
but was able to compromise (for example to brak security of an encrypted
link) only the communication channels leading to and from it (see Figure 2.2).
Internal attackers are viewed as more potent than external attackers since they
have access to more resources and in particular they may observe the agent’s
behaviour at the node to distinguish the agent from others. Considering a
particular node, an internal attacker who managed to compromise the node
has at least as good view as external attackers who managed to compromise
all channels entering and leaving the node. On the other side, the external
attackers are able to observe agents coming from / to other nodes if only they
pass through the channel the adversary observes. Note that the distinction
between the two types of attackers must be made in the context of a particular
container. Thus an attacker who compromised a number of containers but is
aiming at another one (which they were not able to compromise) should be
viewed as external from the point of view of the targeted container.
Omnipresent / k-listening – The adversary may succeed in attacking all nodes
(then the adversary is called the omnipresent adversary), or k of them (the
adversary is called the k-listening adversary [26]). Or, in particular, only one
node may be compromised (the single adversary) [104]. It must be noted that
although in practice it often occurs for the attackers to become omnipresent
adversaries in local area networks (the attacker manages to obtain the ac-
cess to network administrator account), becoming omnipresent adversary in
WANs, is commonly considered as low probable and in the Internet – as infea-
sible3 – due to obvious reasons (resources required and technical difficulty in
breaking into various differently protected systems, complex administration of
distributed agents of the adversary, complex information processing and much
more). In broadly distributed networks the attackers, in the most optimistic
scenarios, manage to observe k selected nodes (which they chose as the nodes
of particular interest).
Active / passive – An active adversary can arbitrarily modify the computations
and messages (by adding and deleting) whereas a passive adversary can only
listen [93].
Static / adaptive – Static adversaries choose the resources they compromise be-
fore the protocol starts and are not able to change them once the protocol
has started. Adaptive adversaries are allowed to change the resources they
control while the protocol is being executed [67, 93]. They can, for example,
‘follow’ messages [93].
Hybrids and alliances – Hybrids and alliances of attackers may occur, such as
external-active or colluding internal and external. Syverson (et al) [104], for
3At least as long as the adversary doesn’t gain a highly institutional or governmental control of
organisations controlling or attempting to govern areas of the Internet – see http://www.wgig.
org/, www.icann.org.
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example, distinguish between multiple adversary and roving adversary, which
are subsequently: k-listening static and k-listening adaptive adversary.
For the matter of convenience the k-listening, roving and omnipresent adversaries
will be altogether called as k-present adversaries4.
2.3.2 Time Correlation
Description
Time correlation, together with content correlation (see the next Section) are the
most basic traffic analysis attacks. Time correlation is, as the name indicates, ac-
tivity of linking incoming and outgoing agents through time relations. In traditional
networks it is easy to trace messages passing intermediate nodes, since the first-in-
first-out rule is often satisfied. Also for agents, if they only pass an intermediate
container, where they don’t perform any tasks, it is very probable that this feature
will occur.
Time correlation may be performed by k-listening or omnipresent adversaries,
or multiple colluding roving adversaries (spying agents) – k-present adversaries (see
the previous section). Either external or internal.
Countermeasures
Countermeasuring this attack is done through breaking the obvious time relations
between incoming and outgoing agents. This can be done through stopping agents
at ech container until a particular number of agents arrives to the container, forming
a batch of agents. Obviously, it must be assured that the messages in the batch
are not located in the same order as they arrived to the mix. This requirement is
satisfied through reordering messages – changing their location in the batch5. This
method was already utilised by Chaum in the first mix [18].
Another method relies on delaying agents for a random time at each container,
where the time of delay is assigned according to probabilistic calculations based
on statistical characteristics of network traffic, to make sure that this will lead to
expected reordering of agents [57].
2.3.3 Correlation Based on Distinguishing Features
Description
The attack is based on the fact that it is easy to recognise and trace agents through
subsequent containers, as long as agents are easy distinguishable from each other.
Such distinguishing features may be, for example, varying, non-uniform size (in
terms of number of packets) of agents or characteristic content of data held by the
4Where k is equal to number of nodes in the network for omnipresent adversaries
5Note that the actual strength of n-batchs doesn’t lie in the fact of releasing messages in
n-sized batchs but in assuring that there are n messages at the same time in the mix (and they
are reordered). In practice, the messages collected in the batch don’t leave the mix concurrently
but in a sequence.
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agent (attacks targeting these particular features are also called content correlation
attacks [49]) [49, 93].
In this attack the goal of the attacker is to follow the agent, thus the more
nodes the attacker is able to observe, the more likely they will discover the agent
base and destination. The attack may be performed by k-present adversaries. Either
external or internal.
There is also active version of the attack (see Agent Tagging 2.3.12).
Countermeasures
To prevent from this attack the agents must be made undistinguishable. First, a
standard size of agents in MAS must be induced (agent size uniformising). After-
wards, all the data which can make agents different to others, must be obfuscated
(data obfuscation or content uniformising). This obfuscation may be done through
one-to-one hashing (permutations), through encryption or any other method which
assures that the obfuscated data are different before and after traversing each con-
tainer (an interesting method of agent data obfuscation can be found in [52]).
Unfortunately, size uniformising of all agents leads either to costly redundancies
if the size is large, or to inconvenient boundaries, if the size is too small, imposing
the distribution of data between more than one agent. Thus at least groups of
agents of the same size should be introduced to MAS.
2.3.4 Brute Force Attack
Description
Suppose the deserted MAS in which just few agents roam. Then an attacker may
learn much about agents bases and destinations just through tracing them. This is,
through observing each agent entering a container and then following all outgoing
agents. This is called brute force attack [93].
This attack may be very successful in deserted MAS’es, especially when the
agents follow separate paths and they don’t meet at the same container at the
same time6.
To the contrary, if the network is very crowded, and agents normally come to the
same containers and stay there at the same time, it is difficult to learn something
about agents since it is difficult to correlate agents coming in and leaving the
same containers (this is actually the observation which stays behind the idea of the
mix [18]).
Even though, one may try to apply the brute force attack since situation in the
network changes and it may happen that in certain network areas some separate
paths will be observed. In this case it is important to perform the attack continuously
for a long time.
The attacker performing a brute force attack must be able to trace multiple
agents if it occurs that the particular agent visits one container and then many
6Needless to say, then there is always one agent entering a container, and one leaving it, and
moreover – this is the same agent.
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agents leave it. Thus the attack is attributed to k-present adversaries (see the
previous section). Either external or internal.
In practice, apart of the deserted MAS case, it is relatively difficult to perform
the brute force attack. First of all it is rather unlikely to obtain access to k-locations
(or all of them) in MAS, or to introduce a high number of spying agents. Second,
the observation must be made during a long time. Finally, correlations in between
the received observations must be found.
Countermeasures
Guaranteeing that containers are always visited by a certain number of agents and
more than one leaves a container at the same moment, decreases the probability of
linking a base and a destination exponentially with the length of the route. However
it may happen that the network has low traffic and at a particular instant, the agent
was the only one which traversed a given route. Then it is totally exposed to an
adversary.
In traditional networks, to avoid this, dummy traffic is usually introduced, which
means redundant messages sent from one places to other to make the network always
occupied. The more dummy messages are sent, the less probable is to correlate
certain messages. This is a costly option, overloading the network, narrowing its
bandwidth, introducing redundant computations.
In MAS, the situation appears to be better, since all nodes are equal in the
sense that there is no distinction between mixes and ordinary nodes (yet all nodes
are mixes). So the attacker cannot easily detect which node is the destination one.
They might guess that it is the last one before returning to the base, but it is
enough to force the agent to traverse additional containers, a so called redundant
agent migration, on its way back to prevent such inferences. Thus if there is only
one destination for a particular agent, it is very difficult to deduce which one is it.
To prevent from discovering the agent’s base station, one option is to introduce
redundant agents which start their lifecycle on random containers and then roam
around the network waiting for a task. Thus when a user needs an agent they pick
it up rather than launch. They assign the agent a task and let the agent migrate in
order to fulfill it. After the agent comes back with the results, the results are read,
and the agent is left free to finish ts lifecycle. Because the agent started its lifecycle
earlier on a container different to the one where it is being picked up, this previous
container is the base container and not the one where the agent was employed.
Note that these redundant agents differ from the ‘dummy’ ones, since they finally
are being used. As well as their number can be controlled and adjusted according
to agents usage statistics.
This means of protection is not as strong as the introduction of dummy traffic,
because the probability decreases linearly with the route length, but it is much less
costly and may be sufficient, especially if the network is naturally loaded with normal
agent traffic.
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2.3.5 Replay Attacks
See Agent Tagging – tagging through shadowing – Section 2.3.12.
2.3.6 Timing Attacks
Description
If traversing a route of a particular length always takes an agent a specific time, then
an adversary may correlate times taken by observed agents. Raymond, for example
[93] assumes two routes to cover, for which subsequently 1 second and 3 seconds
are always required. Then if two messages (as it was already said, the Raymond’s
work is dedicated to message based communication) are observed arriving in the
network at 0:00 and 0:01 and leaving it at 0:03 and 0:02, discovering which message
passed which route is trivial.
Regarding the types of adversaries able to perform this attack, two attack stages
must be distinguished. In the first stage, the attacker measures times needed for
covering different routes. To obtain comprehensive time information, the attacker
must compromise many network locations (to observe which route is being passed
when the time is measured). Thus this part of the attack is performed by k-present
adversaries. Either external or internal.
Once the attacker owns the necessary data, then it is enough to locate at par-
ticular container which the attacker assumes to be a base container for a particular
agent. Then the adversary measures time between the agent leaves and returns to
the container, learning by this which route the agent passed, and possibly what was
its destination. At this stage, it is enough for the adversary to be a single, passive
adversary – internal or external.
It is important to note, that the attacker is already in possession of significant
information if they are able to establish that a container is the base for a particular
agent.
Countermeasures
In MAS, timing attacks are less successful than in traditional networks due to the
difficulty in identifying the destination (see section 2.3.4). What the attacker receives
when performing this attack in MAS is the information about the route the agent
passed, which may indicate some potential destinations.
To increase this already high level of anonymity it is worth considering the
introduction of random delays of agents’ visits to containers or batch processing
(see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.7). Note, that in practical agent environments, in which
agents roam and perform tasks, random delays may naturally result from the tasks.
Furthermore, if redundant migration or redundant agents (see Section 2.3.4) are
applied, then attacker is not able to learn neither about the base nor the destination,
which results in agent’s unlinkability (see Chapter 2.2).
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2.3.7 The Node Flushing Attack (a.k.a. Spam Attack, Flood-
ing Attack, n-1 Attack, Isolate & Identify Attack)
Description
As it was already mentioned when describing the brute force attack (Section 2.3.4),
the key thing to make attackers’ work more difficult is to cause that many agents are
at the same container at the same time so it would be complicated to correlate the
incoming agents and the outgoing ones. As it was described (see Section 2.3.2), the
method which aims at imposing this feature in traditional message communication
is batch processing. The method relies on deliberately collecting n messages before
they are released (flushed – see [93]) from the mix. This causes that messages
leave mixes in n sized batches. The crucial role in this method plays reordering of
messages, so the time correlations between incoming and outgoing messages are
broken. The method hinders performing brute force attacks, as well as timing and
time correlation attacks.
The cost of this functionality are message delays and uneven network traffic.
There are ‘waves’ of messages in the network instead.
The attacker response to this protection is the n-1 attack (other popular names
are: node flushing attack, flooding attack and spam attack). An adversary ‘fills’ the
mix with n-1 of their messages, allowing only one foreign message to join the batch.
Then when the batch of n messages leaves the mix, it is trivial for the adversary to
separate the message which they observed.
This attack is primarily performed by external adversaries. As in previous cases,
to trace the agent the adversary must observe multiple nodes, thus they must be
k-present.
Countermeasures
To prevent from the n-1 attack, it must be assured that either the adversary is not
able to recognise their n-1 agents after they leave the container or to disallow the
attacker to deliver the agents to the container.
When discussing the countermeasures against this attack, Raymond concludes
that by encrypting the traffic between containers, the attacker looses the ability to
easily recognize their agents. But this is not true. If the attacker assures that all
their flooding agents go to a particular container, after leaving the observed one,
then they are distinguishable unless the observed agent also goes to the container
(which actually doesn’t interfere with the main aim of the adversary, which is to
recognise where the agent goes).
This encryption disallows the adversary to recognise their agents through exam-
ination of their data. Raymond discusses the encryption but this can be also one of
other data obfuscation methods discussed in Section 2.3.3.
Another solution (used in Stop-and-Go mixes [57]) is to force agents to wait at
the container for a random amount of time. Then even if the adversary flooded the
container with their n-1 agents causes, they will not leave the container in the same
batch. Instead, k agents not belonging to the adversary will be in the batch, which
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hinders correlating incoming and outgoing agents. This countermeasure appears to
be effective, for the cost of delays in agent communication.
Summarising, in MAS, instead of n-batchs, the agent data obfuscation described
in Section 2.3.3 together with agent delaying is the most effective method of pro-
tection against brute force attacks accompanied with n-1 attacks.
2.3.8 Contextual Attacks
Description
These attacks refer to the communication habits of users. They are performed by
k-present adversaries.
There are three types of attacks in this group: communication pattern attacks,
packet counting attacks and intersection attacks [93].
Communication pattern attacks aim at observing users’ habits in using network
services. A good example of situation making it easy to perform this type of attack
is a company worker who prefers to work late evenings. If the person is the only one
using the company MAS at the particular time then it is not difficult to connect
agents active in the MAS with the person.
In case of packet counting attacks, a user makes the task of tracing them easier
by launching an agent of a characteristic, distinctive size (in terms of number of
packets). This can be done for example through attaching a file to the agent.
When performing intersection attacks, an adversary observes network traffic
and stepwise narrows the range of possible interlocutors (as described in [13]). This
attack actually undermines the defence of using different routes each time an agent
goes to the same destination. Imagine an agent travelling twice from a base A to
a destination B, each time passing through completely different containers. If an
adversary observes these two trips, they notice that the only containers in common
are A and the B, which makes them good candidates for interlocutors.
Countermeasures
A method for avoiding packet counting attacks, called size uniformising was already
described in Section 2.3.3.
In general, contextual attacks are difficult to protect from, because they rely on
factors which are out of the control of system designers and administrators, namely
the unpredictable users behaviours.
The only way to prevent from the attacks is to avoid performing characteristic
activities, for example not to have distinguishing habits.
Thus they are the users who are responsible for protecting themselves: they
should be conscious of the fact that by performing identifiable activities, they be-
come more distinct and thus easier to trace.
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2.3.9 Denial of Service Attacks
Description
First, it must be underlined that the following description focuses on denial of
service (DoS) attacks which aim at compromising untraceability – not on all denial
of service attacks.
An attacker compromises some mix-nodes (making them inoperative), counting
on the fact that this will force users sending their messages through those nodes to
change their behaviour. Though this attack always works in the case of conventional
networks, in many MAS it appears to be ineffective, since agents arbitrarily choose
a different route each time they roam. In case some containers are nonfunctional,
they simply omit them and choose other. This feature of MAS is further described
in the Section 2.3.12.
The attackers must be active (static or adaptive, external or internal) and k-
present adversaries.
Countermeasures
It must be assured that an agent will not behave abnormally when the destination
container is compromised. It means that the agent should pass the whole route as
if nothing had happened (not quickly return to its origin to report the damage).
However it is not required from the agent to continue the completion of its task. The
agent may stop its goal-oriented activities. The important thing is that an outside
observer could not notice the difference in the agent’s behaviour.
For this property, the name failure-neutral behaviour is proposed. It designates
the characteristic of an active entity that it is impossible to distinguish between its
system-normally-operating and system-failure-occurred behaviours, through external
observation. Failure-neutral behaviour is a requirement weaker that fault-tolerance,
however it can be perceived as a part of it. Fault-tolerance refers to a more restricted
property of systems, requiring them to continue their proper operation if the failure
occurrs. For failure-neutral behaviour it’s not required from the entity to remain
properly operating, internal functionalities may get lost.
2.3.10 Active Attacks Exploiting User Reactions
Description
An example of active attack exploiting user reactions is agent interception, cloning
it and sending the clones to all possible recipients. The idea is that the original
recipient will behave differently from others.
As in case of denial of service attacks, these attacks are performed by active
(static or adaptive, external or internal) and k-present adversaries.
Countermeasures
One solution for preventing this kind of attacks, is to assure that agents go further
than to their base containers when returning (redundant agent migration). This
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idea was already described in Section 2.3.4.
Also the feature of completing the whole route even in unusual situations (this
time it is that the declared destination appears not to be the real one) – the failure-
neutral behaviour – as in case of DoS attacks (see section 2.3.9), should be included.
It is very difficult to imagine all the attacks aiming at provoking characteristic
user reactions, and so it’s very difficult if not impossible to propose a one effective
prevention method. It seems that the only realistic approach is through learning from
experience – known from the area of malware protection, where countermeasures
are developed as soon as new attack is discovered. Then it is very important to
exchange knowledge about the attacks and protection against them.
2.3.11 Agent Delaying
Description
In this case, an attacker stops an agent until he gathers enough network resources
or until the network becomes easier to monitor or to see if possible recipients receive
other messages, etc.
The attack is performed by active (static or adaptive, external or internal) ad-
versaries in order to facilitate further investigations of k-present adversaries.
Countermeasures
To protect from this attack, administrators should consider introducing authenti-
cated timing information – securely encapsulating arrival and departure times at
containers into agents. For example time windows, as in Stop-and-MIX’es [57] can
be used.
2.3.12 Agent Tagging
Description
An adversary purportedly ‘marks’ the agent (alters the agent’s data or behaviour to
make the agent distinctive) to facilitate its tracing. There are three types of attacks
identified in this group: tagging data, tagging through delaying and tagging through
shadowing.
The first and the most intuitive type of tagging attacks relies on changing the
agent’s data, so the agent was easily recognised from other agents. The attacker
may add some characteristic data to the agent but also remove or change existing
data.
Feasibility of tagging data attacks is very dependant on a particular MAS archi-
tecture and should be discussed in relation to a real environment. In most cases,
because of network protocol characteristics, such tagging is not feasible on the net-
work layer, what makes the attack unavailable to an external attacker. Thus, in the
first, tagging stage, the attack must be performed by active internal adversaries.
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Once the agent is tagged, its tracing, as in case of correlation based on distin-
guishing features (see Section 2.3.3) belongs to roving adversaries, k-listening or
omnipresent adversaries. Either external or internal.
In contrast to agent delaying attack (see section 2.3.11), the tagging through
delaying attack aims at distinguishing an agent in the network. During this attack,
the attacker forces the agent to stop at each container for a specific, characteristic
time. After this correlating arrivals and departures of such tagged agent to and from
containers is trivial.
The attack is available to active, internal/external attackers, with ability to
observe the agent at multiple containers (thus k-present).
The tagging through shadowing attack (more often known as replay attack [49])
is based on intercepting the agent and copying it. After this, k copies of the agent
traverse the same route. This attack is effective in traditional networks and in the
MAS’es where mobile agents plan their routes using a deterministic algorithm. In
this systems, the copies of messages / agents will follow the same route as the
original.
In MAS’es where agents have freedom in autonomously choosing their route
the attack appears to be useless since each of the copies autonomously chooses its
own route. Thus it is important to make sure that agents choose their routes in a
nondeterministic way. This is called nondeterministic routing. Deterministic routing
forms another serious vulnerability – if adversaries can discover its algorithm they
could predict agent routes.
Countermeasures
Tagging through delaying attacks are to be avoided by means of early detection
of alterations of the agent’s code (tamper detection), or, in the best case, by not
allowing the adversary to change the code of the agent (tamper-resistance). The
methods aiming at detecting agent data alterations are Agent Tampering Detection
by Storage Jamming [72] and various schemas based on hashing agents’ data. In the
latter case it is important to assure that the hashes are verified at each container,
so the alteration was detected before the agent covered its route.
As explained in Chapter 1 preventing agent data from being altered is very
difficult if not infeasible. So far not an effective method has been proposed to
resolve this problem.
Protecting from tagging data attacks is similar to protecting from tagging
through delaying attacks since in both of them it is crucial either to detect or
not to allow the alteration. In case of tagging data attacks the protection task is
slightly easier since this is data – a more static part of agent (comparing to code)
to be processed.
The basic technique for preventing tagging through shadowing attacks is replays
detection which uses one of the following techniques: sequence numbers, random
numbers, data and time stamps [49] or the most ineffective – keeping record of
previous agents [18]. On the other hand if agents choose their routes in nondeter-
ministic way, as it was described above, then the copies of agent don’t follow the
same way as the original, which makes the attack ineffective.
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2.3.13 Corrupted Party Attacks (a.k.a. ‘Sting’ Attacks)
Description
The corrupted party attacks rely on taking over either the agent’s base or the
destination and masquerading as genuine party of the communication. Describing
the attack on the ground of traditional message-based communication Raymond
brings in the example of government agencies setting up home sites with illicit
looking content (such as fake drug-production instructions) and observing queries
to the sites. The same way, the attacker can query sites, and observe responses,
behaving as the initiator of communication.
The mentioned observations of queries and responses can be performed because
the attack assumes that an adversary is able to encode some indicative information
into an agent (see [93]), and then to follow the tagged agent as in case of agent
tagging attacks (see previous Section (2.3.12)).
Thus the corrupted party attacks are primarily attributed to internal active k-
present adversaries.
The attacks prove to be adequate for active internal adversaries who are not
able to observe larger areas of network (in practice – to single adversaries). In this
case, the adversary tries to involve into conversation the user located on the other
side of the communication channel, so the agent after returning to the user, would
came again to the adversary. Then the attacker tries to provoke the user to release
some identifying information about them or to make the agent obtaining address
data of the base container.
Countermeasures
The most effective protection method is to not allow to tag the agent at the des-
tination (tamper resistance, see Section 2.3.12). However this is possible only in
situations where the agent was not envisaged to collect any data from the destina-
tion.
If the agent gets involved into a conversation, then it is difficult to detect if
the exchanged data may serve for the tagging purpose. One approach could be to
detect the data which are not used at the user’s side but returned to the destination
(tamper detection, see Section 2.3.12).
In case of single adversaries aiming at making the user or the agent to realise
identifying information, it must be assured that such information would not released.
Although, it is possible to provide such guaranty for the technical level (through
assuring containers not to disclose their identifying data to agents), as it was already
described for contextual attacks (see Section 2.3.8) – it is impossible to control users’
behaviours. And as in case of contextual attacks, the users must be responsible for
protecting themselves: they should be warned not to share their identifying data
with not trusted parties.
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2.4 Solutions for untraceability of messages
The problem of untraceability was studied extensively for traditional message-based
communication, for which during past 25 years various techniques were proposed.
Most of these techniques are founded on the idea of mix introduced by Chaum
in 1981 [18]. Mix is a proxy, located between message sender and receiver to ob-
fuscate their addresses using cryptographic methods [18]. Chaum considered the
application of multiple mixes (so called cascades). Since mixes can form differ-
ent constellations, such as networks of cascades, multiple-duplicated cascades, tree
structures, networks with restricted choice of patches and others [13] and they can
offer different functionalities, many different mix-extensions have been proposed.
Examples include: Non Disclosure Method (NDM) [32], BABEL [49], Onion Rout-
ing [43,94,103,104], Crowds [95,96], raw remailers, Cypherpunks (Type I remailers),
Mixmasters (Type II remailers) and others [28]. These solutions differ in complexity
and provide varying levels of protection.
Another approach for providing untraceability is based on Chaum’s DC (Dining
Cryptographers) network [19]. However, due to the complexity of the proposed so-
lutions it still remains in the experimental phase [4,101]. Involvement of all partners
in transmission of every message (by forecasting and receiving packets to/from the
others) and the need to share some secret information between the partners make
the proposed protocols very resource consuming. An extension of the DC network,
called DC+ network, was proposed by Waidner (et al) [114, 115]. An interesting
solution are XOR Trees of Dolev (et al) [26].
An alternative conception for obtaining untraceability is publishing the message
among multiple parties, while only one of them (or a subset of them) is the intended
reader. Since the ID of this intended addressee is not stated in the message directly
(implicit addresses are used instead [92]), and the message itself is available to all
participants, there is no indication to whom the message was addressed. This kind
of publishing can be performed through message pools such as newsgroups and
mailing lists [42] or through message broadcasting (with implicit addresses [92]).
The untraceability solutions dedicated to message based communication can
not be directly applied to MAS because they do not respect agents’ autonomy. The
route has to be determined before launching an agent and the spontaneous route
selection during migration is severely restricted, so the advantages agents which
are very useful in some applications (targeting dynamic deployment, load balancing
etc) can not be exploited [46]. Very few solutions for MAS untraceability have been
proposed so far [29,117]. They are based on the conception of onion routing [94]. In
further chapters an untraceability protocol which does not impose such limitations
will be described.
In this chapter an overview of the techniques is provided. Alternative overviews
can be found at [13,42,57,79]. Also an attempt to evaluate some of the techniques
in regard to their resistance to TA attacks was made – see [12].
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2.5 Chapter summary
The chapter described the problem of untraceability. The problem has been studied
extensively for traditional message-based communication for the last twenty five
years and resulted in the thorough description of both: attacks and countermea-
sures. After explaining the notions of untraceability and related terms, the complex
issue of Traffic Analysis is described. The attacks and the relevant countermeasures
are presented. Then the protection techniques developed for the area of traditional
communication are recalled. The techniques appertain to three main groups de-
pending on the method on which they are based: mixes and their modifications, DC
networks, publishing. It was pointed out that not all the methods can be directly ap-
plied to MAS and only mixes can be adapted to a certain degree. The only existing
untraceability solutions for MAS were not actually proposed for directly addressing
the problem of untraceability, and yet as they are based on the conception of onion
routing, they restrict agents ability to spontaneously choose their containers during
migration. This results in the loss of some of the advantages of agents.
Chapter 3
Summary
This report summarised results of studies aiming at the identification of threats to
privacy in agent-based systems and the methods of their protection.
Although anonymity was studied thoroughly for traditional message-based com-
munication and resulted in proposals of various protection techniques, for agent
systems this problem has never been sufficiently addressed. The research presented
in this report aimed at filling this gap.
The first chapter introduced to the area of software agents. It started with
a brief description of the history of software agents, followed by the explanation
of the main concepts related to software agents. Section 1.3 gave an overview
of agents applications and showed that agent based Internet environments are an
interesting alternative to the existing approaches of building software systems. The
enabling feature of agents is that they allow software development based on the
‘metaphor’ (see [70]) of elements of the real world. This means that they allow
building software systems which work as human societies, in which members share
products and services, and cooperate or compete with each other. Organisational,
behavioural and functional models applied in MAS can be copied from the real world.
However, together with many advantages of the new technology, there comes a big
issue – providing sufficient security to agent systems is a demanding challenge to
the researchers and developers of agent systems. This is mainly due to the fact that
agents are fully dependant on their underlying execution environments. The issues
of agents security were presented in Section 1.4.
The second chapter described the problem of untraceability. After explaining
the notions of untraceability and related terms, the tracing attacks against mo-
bile agents were presented together with the adequate countermeasures. Then the
protection techniques developed for the area of traditional communication were re-
called. The techniques can be divided into three categories depending on the method
on which they are based: mixes and their modifications, DC networks, publishing.
The observation was made that not all the methods can be directly applied to MAS
and only mixes can be adapted to a certain degree. The only existing untraceability
solutions for MAS were not actually proposed for directly addressing the problem
of untraceability, and as they are based on the conception of onion routing, they
47
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restrict agents ability to spontaneously choose their containers during migration.
This results in the loss of some of the advantages of agents.
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Abstract 
Agent based Internet environments are an interesting alternative to existing approaches of building 
software systems. The enabling feature of agents is that they allow software development based on the 
abstraction (a ‘metaphor’) of elements of the real world. In other words, they allow building software 
systems, which work as human societies, in which members share products and services, cooperate or 
compete with each other. Organisational, behavioural and functional models etc applied into the systems 
can be copied from the real world. 
The growing interest in agent technologies in the European Union was expressed through the foundation 
of the Coordination Action for Agent-Based Computing, funded under the European Commission’s Sixth 
Framework Programme (FP6). The action, called AgentLink III is run by the Information Society 
Technologies (IST) programme. The long-term goal of AgentLink is to put Europe at the leading edge of 
international competitiveness in this increasingly important area. 
According to AgentLink ‘Roadmap for Agent Based Computing’ agent-based systems are perceived as 
‘one of the most vibrant and important areas of research and development to have emerged in information 
technology in recent years, underpinning many aspects of broader information society technologies.’ 
However, with the emergence of the new paradigm, came also new challenges. One of them is that agent 
environments, especially those which allow for mobility of agents, are much more difficult to protect from 
intruders than conventional systems. Agent environments still lack sufficient and effective solutions to 
assure their security. The problem which till now has not been addressed sufficiently in agent-based 
systems is privacy, and particularly the anonymity of agent users. Although anonymity was studied 
extensively for traditional message-based communication for which during the past twenty five years 
various techniques have been proposed, for agent systems this problem has never been directly 
addressed. 
The research presented in this report aimed at filling this gap. This report summarises results of studies 
aiming at the identification of threats to privacy in agent-based systems and the methods of their 
protection.
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